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Abstract
In the present paper we show how simple monetary policies can mitigate real effects
of credit frictions. We consider stationary overlapping generations economies in which
consumers are not equally efficient in producing capital and cannot commit to repay
loans. The presence of money in itself does not mitigate the real effects of credit fric-
tions. Equilibrium allocations are generally not Pareto optimal unless the returns on
money and capital production are identical for more productive consumers. However,
printing money and distributing it to young consumers increases their incomes allow-
ing young more productive consumers to produce more capital. Consequently money
printing increases output.
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Overview of paper Simple monetary policies in form of printing money can mitigate the
effects of frictions in credit markets in situations like the financial crisis where agents had
limited access to credit. How money transfers are distributed is important for the effective-
ness of these policies. In the present paper we study economies in which consumers cannot
commit to repay loans and examine the effects on output and welfare of monetary policies
in form of printing money and distributing it to agents.
We consider overlapping generations (OG) economies with production. There are four
commodities: a consumption good, capital, labor and money. Consumers live for two dates,
consume both when young and old, and work when young. Moreover they produce capi-
tal by use of the consumption good. Some consumers are more productive than others in
production of capital. Firms produce the consumption good by use of capital and labor.
Productivities of consumers are common knowledge. Therefore from an efficiency point
of view less productive consumers should leave capital production to more productive con-
sumers.
We assume that there is a friction in the credit market: consumers cannot commit to
repay loans. Since consumers live for two dates, usual penalties such as exclusion from
taking loans or exclusion from both taking and making loans are ineffective. Hence debt is
constrained to zero. Consequently there is no transfer of resources between consumers in
the same generation so both kinds of consumers can very well be investing in capital pro-
duction. The presence of money does not induce less productive consumers to move their
savings from capital production by themselves to capital production by more productive con-
sumers. However printing money and distributing it to more productive consumers enables
them to buy consumption goods from less productive consumers. Thereby more productive
consumers produce more capital and less productive consumers hold more money. Hence
printing money mitigates the effects of the debt constraints.
Equilibria are prices, consumption plans and production plans such that consumers max-
imize utilities, firm maximize profits and markets clear. Money need not be valuable in
equilibrium. Steady states are equilibria where consumption and production are constant
across dates. In Theorem 1 we show that there are steady states where money is valuable.
To study the impact of changing monetary policy from the passive policy with no transfers
to an active policy with non-trivial transfers we consider a scenario with the passive policy
before some date and an active policy after that date. There are two steps: first in Theorem
2 we show monetary steady states with active monetary policies exist and active monetary
policies increase output compared to the passive monetary policy; and, second we show that
output increases in the transition from a steady state with the passive policy to a steady state
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with the active policy. Active policies have several effects on consumers: additional income
for consumers who receive transfers as well as higher wages and lower returns on savings
for all consumers.
Our results in Theorems 1 and 2 are obtained under reasonably general assumptions. In
Section 5 we study an example to further illustrate our findings as well as the welfare im-
plications of monetary policies. Consumers consume only when old. Thereby the negative
effect of monetary policies on the returns on savings is maximized. Consumption goods
are produced by use of Cobb-Douglas production functions. Scenarios with transfers to all
young consumers and transfers solely to more productive young consumers are considered.
If the elasticity of capital is larger than the fraction of more productive consumers, then
printing money increases welfare of all consumers in both scenarios.
Returns on money and producing capital are determined in equilibrium. Unless these re-
turns are equal for the more productive consumers, the two kinds of consumers face different
returns on savings. Therefore it is possible to improve welfare by changing consumption at
any two consecutive dates without changing production at any date or consumption at any
other date than the two consecutive dates. In general, monetary policies in form of printing
money and distributing it to young consumers cannot make returns equal. However these
policies are simple and mitigate the real effects of debt constraints. Monetary policies in-
volving money taxes eliminate the need for printing money, but enforcement of tax payment
is needed. Hence institutions enforcing payment of taxes have to be available.
Related literature Our model is a degenerate example of a model with endogenous debt
limits in which debt limits are zero because consumers live for two dates. However if con-
sumers lived longer and the penalty for not repaying loans was exclusion from both taking
and making loans, then debt constraints would become endogenous and depend on future
prices. Kehoe and Levine (1993) study pure exchange optimal growth economies where
consumers cannot commit to repay loans and defaulting consumers are excluded from fu-
ture trading in financial markets.
Kocherlakota (2009), Farhi and Tirole (2012), Liu and Wang (2014) and Miao and Wang
(2012, 2017) consider economies with endogenous debt constraints where some assets may
be used as collateral. The assets used as collateral vary from worthless land to output of and
shares in firms taking loans. The main finding is that bubbles in the assets used as collateral
can mitigate the effects of debt constraints.
Kunieda (2008) and Martin and Ventura (2012, 2016) consider OG economies with pro-
duction where consumers differ with respect to their productivity and face debt constraints.
In Kunieda (2008) there is a continuum of different productivities and dynamic efficiency of
steady-state equilibria is studied. With constant nominal money supply, too few consumers
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engage in capital production and too many consumers hold money. Monetary policies in
form of distributing money to less productive old consumers work in that they decrease the
return on holding money, so some of the less productive consumers move their savings to
capital production from money. It is shown that there is a monetary policy that achieves con-
strained dynamic efficiency. However, the policy is not a Pareto improvement compared to
constant money supply. Most of the analysis is carried out with Cobb-Douglas economies
and focuses on steady states. We study a different channel through which monetary pol-
icy can work. Indeed, we show monetary policies in form of distributing money to young
consumers work in that they enable more productive young consumers to produce more
capital. The channel is that the monetary transfers increase incomes of more productive
young consumers so they increase their savings. Since more productive young consumers
have a comparative advantage in capital production, they use their increases in savings to in-
crease their engagement in capital production. Most of the analysis is carried out for general
economies and focuses on transitional dynamics as well as steady states.
In Martin and Ventura (2012, 2016), there are two productivities and bubbles on assets
are studied. Bubbles are stochastic in that old bubbles may die and new bubbles may arise.
These bubbles can be interpreted as bubbles in financial assets like shares, but they cannot be
interpreted as money because they affect some assets and not all assets. Such bubbles affect
the value of assets used as collateral in credit transactions. Their welfare analysis focuses
primarily on steady states. In terms of policy, they look at a possible macro-prudential role of
a Lender of Last Resort, which guarantees credit when collateral is scarce and taxes credit
when it is excessive. While we consider a similar mechanism, we study equilibria where
money is a deterministic bubble that is controlled by monetary policy. Also, our setup is
more general and we analyze the existence of equilibria and the real effects of monetary
policy in the steady state and in transition. Our aim is to provide a rationale for an active
monetary policy.
One strand of the literature on the role of money emphasizes differences in liquidity of
financial assets. Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) consider optimal growth economies with firms
operated by entrepreneurs under endogenous debt constraints. Opportunities to produce
capital arrive randomly. Entrepreneurs can finance production of capital by selling their
portfolio of money and equity in other firms or by issuing equity. However they can sell
only a fraction of their equity in other firms and commit to pay their shareholders only a
fraction of future returns on capital. The fraction of future returns on capital that can be
used as collateral varies randomly. Printing money and distributing it like helicopter drops
has no real effects.
Another strand is formed by the New Monetarist literature. There, micro-founded
search-theoretical models of money are often used to evaluate monetary policies. For these
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models Gu et al. (2016) find that money and credit are perfect substitutes and that this
finding is robust to variations in policy, debt limit and use of collateral. Chiu and Molico
(2010) find that mildly expansionary redistributive monetary policy can potentially be wel-
fare improving by relaxing the liquidity constraint of some agents. Williamson (2008) finds
that market segregation, where some agents have access to money markets and other do
not, implies that printing money and distributing it through money markets have distribu-
tional effects. In our economies, the presence of money is not a perfect remedy for debt
constraints, and the presence of perfectly functioning credit markets would not necessarily
eliminate dynamic inefficiency of equilibrium allocations. Consequently money and credit
are not perfect substitutes.
Sorger (2005) considers stability and determinacy of monetary steady states in OG
economies with homogeneous consumers and without financial frictions. Monetary pol-
icy is described by inflation targeting or inflation forecast targeting. Unlike conventional
wisdom, it is shown that active inflation forecast targeting can lead to indeterminacy. Mon-
etary policy is implemented by printing money and distributing it to consumers when old.
We consider heterogeneous consumers who cannot commit to repay debt. Monetary policy
that distributes money to young consumers is shown to be welfare-improving. We show that
real outcomes can be different for the same inflation rate, and that the real effect of printing
money depends on how it is distributed.
Plan of the paper In Section 2 our model is introduced. In Section 3 equilibria, steady states
and equilibrium dynamics are defined and studied for economies without money printing.
In Section 4 the effects of printing money and distributing it to young more productive con-
sumers are studied. In Section 5 an example is considered and the output and welfare effects
of monetary policies consisting of printing money and distributing it to young consumers,
both more productive and less productive, are worked out. Section 6 contains some final
remarks.
2 The model
We consider stationary overlapping generations economies with perfectly competitive mar-
kets. Our economies have two distinctive features: consumers are not equally efficient in
producing capital and consumers cannot commit to repay loans. In the present section we
introduce our model and examine the decision problems of the agents.
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Setup
Time is discrete and extends from −∞ to +∞. At every date there are a consumption
good, capital, labor and possibly money. The consumption good is used as numeraire. Let
(qt ,rt ,wt) ∈ R+×R2++ be the prices of money, capital and labor at date t. Markets are
assumed to be perfectly competitive.
At every date a continuum of identical consumers is born. They live for two subsequent
dates, consume when young and old and work when young. The mass of consumers in every
generation is normalized to one. A consumer is described by her consumption set X =R2++,
homothetic utility function u : X→R and her endowment of one unit of labor when young.
There is no utility or disutility associated with working so the labor supply is equal to one.
Consumers are supposed to satisfy the following assumptions:
(C.1) u ∈C2(X ,R) with Du(c) ∈ R+×R++ for all c and vT D2u(c)v < 0 for all c and v 6= 0
with v·Du(c) = 0.
(C.2) u−1(a) = {c ∈ X | u(c) = a} is closed in R2 for all a.
The first assumption states that the utility function is twice differentiable, strongly monotone
and strictly quasi-concave. The second assumption implies indifference curves do not tend
to the axes.
Savings can be in the consumption good and in money. Consumers in generation t can
transform the consumption good xt at date t into capital kt at date t+1 by use of a linear
technology kt = βxt with β > 0 and sell the capital to firms at price rt+1. The real return
on producing capital is rt+1β . Moreover consumers can exchange the consumption good
for money mt . Money is a durable good that yields no utility. For qt > 0 the real return on
money is qt+1/qt .
There is a continuum of identical firms that transform capital and labor at date t into the
consumption good at date t. A firm is described by its production function F : R2++→R++
with Y = F(K,L). Firms are supposed to satisfy the following assumptions:
(F.1) F(aK,aL) = aF(K,L) for all a > 0 and (K,L).
(F.2) F ∈C2(R2++,R++) with DF(K,L)∈R2++ for all (K,L) and vT D2F(K,L)v < 0 for all










The first assumption states that the production function has constant returns to scale. The
second assumption states that the production function is twice differentiable, strongly mono-
tone and strictly quasi-concave. The third assumption is the standard Inada conditions. Cap-
ital depreciates completely during production.
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Our economies have two distinctive features. The first feature is that there are two
technologies for producing capital, βL and βH , with βL < βH . Some consumers, denoted L-
consumers, have access to the low-productive technology, and others, denoted H-consumers,
have access to the high-productive technology. The proportions of consumers with access
to the two technologies are δL,δH > 0.
The second feature is that consumers cannot commit to repay loans. Therefore L-
consumers are not willing to lend their savings to H-consumers although the latter have
access to a superior technology compared with the former. Consequently, consumers save
by producing capital on their own or by holding money, but not by lending. From an effi-
ciency point of view L-consumers should lend to H-consumers rather than produce capital
themselves.
An economy is a description of consumers and firms E = (u,βL,βH ,δL,δH ,F). In Sec-
tions 3 and 3 there is a fixed stock of money M > 0 and in Section 4 there is money printing.
The consumer problem










cyit +qtmit + xit ≤ wt
coit ≤ qt+1mit + rt+1kit
kit ≤ βixit
mit ,xit ≥ 0.
(1)
A consumption plan for an i-consumer in generation t is a consumption bundle, input and
output in capital production and nominal savings (cit ,xit ,kit ,mit) satisfying the inequalities
in Problem (1).
Since the utility function is homothetic implying the demand function is homogeneous of




s.t. pcy + co ≤ p.
Assumptions (C.1) and (C.2) imply there is a differentiable function f : R++ → X such
that f (p) = ( f y(p), f o(p)) is a solution to the problem (see Tvede, 2010). The function
s : R++→]0,1[ defined by s(p) = 1− f y(p) is related to the function f by f y(p) = 1−s(p)
and f o(p) = ps(p). The real interest rate is p−1 and if income is one when young and zero
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when old, then real savings are s(p). Real savings are assumed to be bounded away from




The assumption is satisfied for many utility functions, including Cobb–Douglas and CES
utility functions with positive elasticity of substitution.
For convenience, consumption is assumed to be positive both when young and when
old. Savings wt−cyt are positive for all real interest rates because consumers have no income
when old. However, since we use real savings rather than demand in our analysis, it is not
important whether consumers consume both when young and when old X = R2++ or solely
when old X = {0}×R++. In the latter case real savings are constant and equal to one,
making real savings independent of real interest rates.
Let pt+1 = qt+1/qt be the return on savings for those holding money and rt+1βi the return
on savings for those making productive investments. If rt+1βi < pt+1, then the solution to
the consumer problem (1) is 







If rt+1βi > pt+1 the solution is 




If rt+1βi = pt+1, then the return on capital production is equal to the return on money and
all convex combinations of the two solutions are solutions.
For rt+1βL > pt+1 all consumers save by producing capital. For rt+1βL < pt+1 < rt+1βH
L-consumers save by holding money and H-consumers save by producing capital. Finally,
for rt+1βH < pt+1 all consumers save by holding money.
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The firm problem




s.t. Yt ≤ F(Kt ,Lt).
A production plan for a firm at date t is inputs and output (Kt ,Lt ,Yt) satisfying the inequality




(F.1)–(F.3) imply η ′L(K) > 0 > η
′
K(K) for all K, limK→0 ηK(K) = limK→∞ ηL(K) = ∞ and
limK→∞ ηK(K) = limK→0 ηL(K) = 0.







The assumption is satisfied for many production functions, including both Cobb–Douglas
and CES production functions.
Profit maximization implies that the solution to the problem of the firm satisfies the
standard first-order conditions
rt = ηK(Kt)
wt = ηL(Kt) = ηL◦η−1K (rt).
3 Equilibria
In the present section we study existence of equilibria and steady states as well as equilib-
rium dynamics.
Definition of equilibrium
Equilibria are sequences of prices, consumption plans and production plans such that con-
sumers maximize their utilities, firms maximize their profits and markets clear.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a sequence of prices, consumption plans and production
plans
((q̄t , r̄t , w̄t)t∈Z,(c̄it , x̄it , k̄it , m̄it)i∈{L,H},t∈Z,(K̄t , L̄t ,Ȳt)t∈Z),
such that
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• Consumers maximize utility: (c̄it , x̄it , k̄it , m̄it) is a solution to the problem of an i-
consumer in generation t for both i and every t.
• Firms maximize profits: (K̄t , L̄t ,Ȳt) is a solution to the problem for a firm at date t for
every t.
















Equilibria can be monetary or real depending on whether money has value at every date
or not. We focus exclusively on monetary equilibria.
Let λit , respectively (1−λit), be the share of savings of an i-consumer that goes into
production of capital, respectively into holding money. Then equilibria are associated with
solutions (qt ,rt ,λLt ,λHt)t∈Z to the following difference equation:
η
−1
K (rt+1) = (λLtβLδLs(rt+1βL)+λHtβHδHs(rt+1βH))ηL◦η
−1
K (rt)

























The first equation in Equation (2) is market clearing for the capital market with the capital
demanded by firms on the left and the capital supplied by consumers on the right. The first
part on the right is share of income allocated to investment in capital production and the
second part is the real wage. The second equation is market clearing for the money market
with real money supplied by old consumers and real money demanded by young consumers.
The first part on the right is the share of income allocated to holding money and the second
part is the real wage. The third equation describes how the share of income invested in
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capital production is determined for both i’s. For fixed rt+1 and qt+1 the three equations
determine rt , qt and λit for both i’s. Money allows transfers of resources across generations
(Samuelson, 1958; Diamond, 1965; Gale, 1973; Balasko and Shell 1980; Tirole, 1985).
Steady states
Steady states are equilibria for which consumption possibilities are identical across genera-
tions.
Definition 2 A steady state is an equilibrium
((q̄t , r̄t , w̄t)t∈Z,(c̄it ,xit , k̄it , m̄it)i∈{L,H}, t∈Z,(K̄t , L̄t ,Ȳt)t∈Z)
for which there are ((p̄, r̄, w̄),(c̄i, x̄i, k̄i)i∈{L,H},(K̄, L̄,Ȳ )) such that (p̄t , r̄t , w̄t) = (p̄, r̄, w̄) and
(c̄it , x̄it , k̄it) = (c̄i, x̄i, k̄i) for both i and (K̄t , L̄t ,Ȳt) = (K̄, L̄,Ȳ ) for every t.
Our first result is that all economies, for which savings are strictly larger than demand
for capital at the real return on capital equal to 1/βL, have monetary steady states.




K (r) < (βLδLs(rβL)+βHδHs(rβH))ηL◦η
−1
K (r).
Proof: At monetary steady states q̄t+1/q̄1 = 1 for every t because otherwise q̄tM is not
constant across dates. Therefore 1/βH ≤ r̄ ≤ 1/βL at monetary steady states, otherwise
either nobody would hold money or nobody would produce capital. The first and the third
difference equations in (2) can be used to find (r,λL,λH) with λH +λL ∈ (0,2). The second
difference equation in (2) can be used to find q > 0.





K (r) ≥ ηL◦η
−1
K (r).





K (r) = ηL◦η
−1
K (r).
Hence there is a monetary steady state with r̄ = 1/βL where part of the L-consumers saves
by holding money and the rest saves by producing capital.
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′) > ηL◦η−1K (r′).






′′) = ηL◦η−1K (r
′′).
Hence, by continuity, there is a monetary steady state with r̄ = r′′ where all L-consumers
save by holding money and all H-consumers save by producing capital.













′) ≤ ηL◦η−1K (r′).






′) = ηL◦η−1K (r
′).
Hence the condition in Theorem 1 implies there is a monetary steady state with r̄ = r′ where
part of the H-consumers saves by producing capital and the rest saves by holding money. 2
There are three kinds of monetary steady states: L-consumers are indifferent between
saving by holding money and saving by producing capital p̄ = βLr̄; L-consumers prefer to
save by holding money and H-consumers prefer to save by producing capital p̄ ∈]βLr̄,βH r̄[;
and, finally, H-consumers are indifferent between saving by holding money and saving by
producing capital p̄ = βH r̄.
Weakly Pareto optimal allocations, introduced in Balasko and Shell (1980), are alloca-
tion for which it is not possible to improve welfare by changing consumption at finitely
many dates. Without frictions, allocations are weakly Pareto optimal if and only if they
can be supported by prices. Consumption in the two first types of monetary steady states is
not weakly Pareto optimal because L-consumers and H-consumers in the same generation
have different marginal rates of substitution. Transfers of resources from L-consumers to
H-consumers when young and from H-consumers to L-consumers when old could improve
welfare for everybody. Consumption in the last type of monetary steady states is weakly
Pareto optimal because L-consumers and H-consumers in the same generation have identi-
cal marginal rates of substitution.
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Dynamics
Equilibria can be everything from steady states to chaotic. However, complicated dynamics
are eliminated by the assumption that savings are non-decreasing in the real interest rate.
From the first-order condition of the normalized problem
−Dyu(1−s, ps)+ pDou(1−s, ps) = 0.
it follows that savings are non-decreasing in the real interest rate if and only if
D2you(1−s, ps)−D2oou(1−s, ps)−Dou(1−s, ps) ≤ 0.
The condition is mathematically, but not economically, clear.
Monetary dynamics depend on whether consumers prefer to produce capital, hold money
or both. In the case where L-consumers are indifferent between holding money and produc-
ing capital and H-consumers prefer to produce capital, so rt+1βL = pt+1. Equation (2)












For fixed rt and qt , the two equations determine rt+1 and λLt while qt+1 is determined by
qt+1 = qtrt+1βL. In a steady state p̄= 1 so r̄ = 1/βL. Therefore there is at most one monetary
steady state where L-consumers are indifferent between holding money and producing cap-
ital and H-consumers prefer to produce capital independent of whether s is non-decreasing
or not. Concerning the forward dynamics there is at most one rt+1, λLt and qt+1 for fixed rt
and qt provided s is non-decreasing.
In the case where L-consumers prefer to hold money and H-consumers prefer to produce

















The first equation defines the evolution of rt . For a fixed evolution of rt the second equation
defines the evolution of qt . For the first equation, the first part on the left need not be
monotonic in rt+1, the second part on the left is decreasing in rt+1 and the part on the right
is decreasing in rt . Since the range of ηL◦η−1K is ]0,∞[ and the part on the right is decreasing
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in rt , for all rt+1 there is a unique rt such that (rt ,rt+1) is a solution to the first equation.
Consequently the backward equilibrium dynamics are well defined.
If savings are not non-decreasing in the real interest rate, then the first part on the left
of the first equation can be non-monotonic in rt+1. Consequently the forward equilibrium
dynamics need not be well defined and there can be multiple steady states and complex
dynamics. If savings are non-decreasing in the real rate of interest, then the first part on the
left is non-increasing in rt+1 implying the part on the left is decreasing in rt+1. Since the
range of η−1K is ]0,∞[ and part on the left is decreasing in rt+1, for all rt there is a unique rt+1
such that (rt ,rt+1) is a solution to the first equation. Consequently the forward dynamics are
well defined.
In the case where L-consumers prefer to hold money and H-consumers are indifferent
between holding money and producing in capital, rt+1βH = pt+1. Equation (2) without the












For fixed rt and qt the two equations determine rt+1 and λHt while qt+1 is determined by
qt+1 = qtrt+1βH . In a steady state p̄ = 1 so r̄ = 1/βH . Therefore there is at most one mone-
tary steady state where L-consumers prefer to hold money and and H-consumers are indif-
ferent between holding money and investing in capital. Concerning the forward dynamics
there is at most one rt+1, λLt and qt+1 for fixed rt and qt provided s is non-decreasing.
4 Printing money
Since our setup and the setup used by Martin and Ventura (2012, 2016) are similar, printing
money and distributing it to young productive consumers could be expected to work more or
less as new bubbles created by young productive consumers in their model. However, money
is a bubble directly influenced by monetary policy and is not subject to random creation and
random bursts. Also, bubbles associated with financial assets cannot be negative while
monetary transfers can be.
To assess the implications of monetary policy for the real economy in steady states
as well as during the transition, we consider a scenario with a passive monetary policy
before some date and an active monetary policy after that date. First in Theorem 2 we show
monetary steady states with active policies exist and in monetary steady states active policies
increase output compared to the passive policy. Second we show output increases at every
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date in the transition from a steady state for the passive policy to a steady state for the active
policy.
Steady states with money printing
Let Nyit (N
o
it ) be the monetary transfers to young (old) i-consumers at date t. For fixed prices
monetary transfers increase incomes of consumers receiving them and these income in-
creases lead to higher consumption both when young and when old provided consumption
when young and consumption when old are normal goods. Therefore for fixed prices mon-
etary transfers to young consumers, but not to old consumers, lead to higher savings so
monetary transfers to young H-consumers lead to more production of capital.
Three scenarios of monetary policies are considered, namely newly printed money is
distributed: 1. Exclusively to young H-consumers; 2. To both kinds of young consumers in
equal amounts; and, 3. Exclusively to young L-consumers. In the first and third scenarios
monetary transfers depend on the kind of as well as the age of the consumers and in the
second scenario monetary transfers depend solely on the age of the consumers. In the first










Lt ≥ 0 and
NoHt = N
o
Lt = 0 for every t; and, in the third N
y






Lt = 0 for every t.























































The first equation in Equation (3) is market clearing for the capital market with demand for
capital of firms minus supply of capital financed by money transfers on the left and supply
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of capital financed by wage income on the right. The second equation is market clearing
for the money market with supply of money minus demand for money financed by money
transfers on the left and demand for money financed by wage income on the right. The third
equation describes how the share of income invested in capital production is determined for
both i’s. The fourth equation describes how the stock of money evolves.
For our result on existence of and output at monetary steady states with monetary trans-
fers to young consumers we consider monetary policies of the form Nyit = ε
y
i Nt for both i
with εi ≥ 0 for both i and δLεL +δHεH = 1.
Theorem 2 Consider an economy E . Let Nt/Mt = n for every t and assume for r = 1/βL,
η
−1
K (r) < (βLδLs(rβL)+βHδHs(rβH))ηL◦η
−1
K (r).
Then there is a neighborhood of the passive monetary policy n = 0 such that
• There are monetary steady states with money printing for all policies in the neighbor-
hood.
• Assume εH > 0. Minimum (maximum) output for all active policies with n > 0 in the
neighborhood is larger than minimum (maximum) output for the passive policy.
• Assume εH = 0. Then a active policy n > 0 removes monetary steady states with r >
(1−n)/βL for the passive policy and does not change steady states with r < (1−n)/βL
for the passive policy.
Proof: Let µ ∈]0,1[ be defined by λL ≥ µ implies for r = 1/βL,
η
−1
K (r) < (λLβLs(rβL)+βHs(rβH))ηL◦η
−1
K (r).
Let ν ∈]0,1[ be defined by n ∈ [0,ν ] implies 1− (δLεL+δHεH)s(1−n)n > 0 and for all
r ∈ [(1−n)/βL,1/βL] and λL ≥ µ ,
η
−1
K (r) < (λLβLs(rβL)+βHs(rβH))ηL◦η
−1
K (r).







Then Q(r,n,λL,λH) is the steady state price for money for real return on capital r, policy
n and fractions of consumers saving by producing capital (λL,λH). Let the correspondence
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Λ : R++×[0,ν ]→ [0,µ]×[0,1] be defined by
Λ(r,n) =

{(0,0)} for r < 1−n
βH







[0,µ]×{1} for r = 1−n
βL
{(µ,1)} for r > 1−n
βH
.
Then Λ(r,n) is the steady state fractions of consumers saving by producing capital for
real return on capital r and policy n – except λL is restricted to [0,µ]. Moreover, Λ
is upper hemi-continuous with convex values and Λ is single valued at (r,n) for r /∈
{(1−n)/βH ,(1−n)/βL}. Let function E : R2++×[0,ν ]×[0,µ]×[0,1]→ R be defined by
E(r,q,n,λL,λH) = η−1K (r)− (λLβLs(rβL)εL+λHβHs(rβH)εH)qMn
−(λLβLs(rβL)+λLβLs(rβL))ηL◦η−1K (r).
Then E(r,q,n,λL,λH) is the excess demand for capital for real return on capital r, price of
money q, policy n and fractions of consumers saving by producing capital (λL,λH). More-
over for r = (1−n)/βH and n ∈ [0,µ], E(r,Q(r,n,0,0),n,0,0)> 0 with (0,0) ∈ Λ(r,n) and
for r = (1−n)/βL and all n ∈ [0,µ], E(r,Q(r,n,µ,1),n,µ,1)< 0 with (µ,1) ∈ Λ(r,n).





Then there is a monetary steady state with return on capital r and policy n if and only if
0 ∈ Θ(r,n). Moreover Θ is upper hemi-continuous and convex valued where v0 ∈ Θ(r,0)
and vn ∈ Θ(r,n) for n > 0 implies vn < v0 for all r. Since Θ(r,n) > 0 for r = (1−n)/βH
and all n ∈ [0,µ] and Θ(r,n) < 0 for r = (1−n)/βL and all n ∈ [0,µ], there is a monetary
steady state with money printing for all n∈ [0,µ]. For εH > 0 the minimum (maximum) real
return on capital for all active policies is smaller than the minimum (maximum) real return
on capital for the passive policy, because v0 ∈ Θ(r,0) and vn ∈ Θ(r,n) for n > 0 implies
vn < v0 for all r as well as Θ(r,n) > 0 for r = (1−n)/βH and all n ∈ [0,µ] and Θ(r,n) < 0
for r = (1−n)/βL and all n ∈ [0,µ]. For εH = 0 an active policy n removes monetary steady
states for the passive policy with r > (1−n)/βL and does not change steady states for the
passive policy with r < (1−n)/βL. 2
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Transitional dynamics
In the discussion below we assume that: savings are non-decreasing in returns on savings;
and, the return on capital production for L-consumers is lower than the return on money
and the return on money is lower than the return on capital production for H consumers.
The second assumption implies that L-consumers save by holding money and H-consumers
save by producing capital. Output as well as net-output, where net-output is output minus
input in capital production, are increased by active policies compared to the passive policy
provided young H-consumers receive transfers, because the return in output of input in
capital production is larger than one.
In order to study the dynamic effects of changing monetary policy consider a locally
stable steady state. Then there is a neighborhood of the passive policy n = 0 such that the
steady states with money printing are locally stable for all policies in that neighborhood.
Hence if money printing is started at date t, then there is a transition from the steady state
without money printing to the steady state with money printing. Indeed young consumers
adjust their demands and savings from date t and forward and prices adjust from date t+1
and forward. The transition is monotonic with output increasing from date t+1 and forward

























Figure 1: Monetary policy and monetary dynamics
At monetary steady states with money printing, transfers to consumers have a direct
effect on the return of money. Since the real value of money has to be constant across dates,
the price of the consumption good has to increase faster with monetary transfers than without
monetary transfers. Therefore printing money decreases the return on existing money. All
in all, distributing newly printed money solely to young H-consumers or to both kinds of
young consumers increases output by reducing the inefficiencies in capital production, and,
distributing money solely to young L-consumers does not change output. Since printing
money increases output, the stock of capital increases. Hence the real wage is increased.
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Therefore for consumers there are two main effects of money printing, namely lower returns
on savings and higher real income, where the higher income comes from higher real wage
as well as transfers.
It is straightforward and quite tedious to calculate the changes in indirect utilities caused
by money printing. However the expressions are not easy to evaluate. As explained above,
there are two effects pointing in opposite directions. In the next section, we consider an
example where the negative effect from lower returns on savings is maximized by assuming
that consumers solely consume when old and derive a condition on the output elasticity
of capital for Cobb-Douglas production functions that ensure welfare is increased for both
kinds of consumers.
5 An example
To discuss boundaries for monetary policy as well as optimal policies and inflation rates, we
reconsider the model economy as put forward in Martin and Ventura (2012) in this section.
We also show by means of numerical examples that the business cycle fluctuations which
Martin and Ventura (2012) attribute to stochastic assets bubbles can also arise in perfect
foresight equilibria with deterministic monetary policy rules.
Setup
Consumers care only about consumption when old, i.e. X = {0}×R++. Therefore all in-
come received when young will be saved, i.e. s(p) = 1 for all p. This means that the welfare
results of our example are conservative in that the negative effects of money printing are
maximized. Second, production of goods takes place according to a Cobb-Douglas function
F (Kt ,Lt) = Kσt L
1−σ
t
with σ ∈ (0,1) being the output elasticity of capital.
For convenience, transfers to young consumers are written as multiples γ ∈ R of total
wages when young, i.e. Nyit = γ
y
itwt/qt . If γ > 0, a consumer receives money and if γ < 0 she
pays money. As before, transfers to old consumers are not considered as they would have
redistributive effects only.
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The consumer problem at date t for a young consumer is
max




xit +qtmit ≤ wt +qtNyit
coit ≤ qt+1mit + rt+1kit
kit ≤ βixit
mit ,xit ≥ 0.
(4)
Since s(p) = 1 so f y(p) = 0 and f o(p) = p, the solution to the consumer problem for




















For rt+1βi = pt+1, the return on capital production is equal to the return on money and all
convex combinations of the two solutions are solutions.
The solution to the firm problem at date t satisfies
rt = ηK(Kt) = σKσ−1t ,
wt = ηL(Kt) = (1−σ)Kσt .
Finally, the path for the aggregate money stock, {Mt}t∈Z is described by






In this example, we restrict our attention to equilibria in which L-consumers prefer to save
by holding money and H-consumers by producing capital, i.e., rt+1βL < pt+1 < rt+1βH for
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every t. As will be shown, this is the only equilibria where active monetary policy could be
expansionary in our setting.


































































L for all t. Accordingly, a monetary expansion increases capital
and output at steady-state provided if new money is transferred to young H-consumers.
However the return on money and consequently inflation depend on all drivers of the stock
of money.
The equilibrium allocations associated with monetary steady states are dynamically ef-








It can be shown that equilibrium allocations associated with real steady states are dy-











Money restores efficiency because L-consumers switch their savings from investing in cap-
ital production to holding money.
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Implications for monetary policy
We now look at the conditions for which monetary steady states exist. We restrict attention
to monetary policies for which the associated allocation is dynamically efficient. Otherwise,
the incremental output due to monetary policy would necessarily be welfare-reducing.

















There are monetary steady states provided βLrM < pM < βHrM or, equivalently, if
0 < F(γyH)ξ
−1−βL < βH−βL.
Let G : R→ R be defined by G(γ) = F(γ)ξ−1−β , and (γ1(β ),γ2(β )) the two solutions to
G(γ) = 0. There are two cases, namely ξ > 0 and ξ < 0. Suppose ξ > 0. If (2δH)−2ξ−1 <
βL, then there is no γ
y
H for which a monetary steady state exists. Let ν ≡ (δLβL)/(δHβH). If
γ2(βL)> ν , then there are monetary steady states and output is higher than at the real steady
state with output being maximal for γyH = γ2(βL). In all other cases where ξ > 0 there are
monetary steady states, but output is lower than at real steady states. Suppose ξ < 0. Then
γ2(βH)> ν if and only if there are monetary steady states with γ
y
H = γ2(βH) at which output
is higher than at real steady states. Otherwise there are monetary steady states, but output is
lower than at real steady state.
Whether monetary policies which increase output exist depends on γyL because it deter-
mines ξ and consequently the solution to G(γ) = 0. Output converges to its supremum for
ξ converging to zero. Policies that result in ξ tending to zero tax away income of young
L-consumers (γyL close to minus one). For γ
y
H converging to δL/δH , the steady-state interest












Therefore the supremum output is dynamically efficient provided σ/(1−σ)≥ 1 so the rate
of return on capital production βH r̄M is at least 1.
Finally, assume that transfers to the two types of consumers have to be identical, per-
haps because productivity in capital production is private information or because of political
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reluctance to discriminate between consumers. Hence γyi = γ























Welfare comparison of steady states
The following welfare comparison of steady states shows that there is a wide range of pa-
rameters for which monetary policies with relatively small money transfers improve welfare
for both consumer types in the long-run. The reference scenario is a passive monetary policy
without money transfers, i.e. where γyL = γ
y
H = γ
I = 0. We consider two active monetary poli-
cies: one policy with money transfers solely to young H-consumers, i.e. γyH = γ
A > 0,γyL = 0;







Welfare of H-consumers is higher for active monetary policies compared to the reference






which is larger one. As for L-consumers, the welfare effects are more delicate. Active






















The expression on the right hand side is decreasing in γyH and, according to L’Hôpital’s rule,
converges to σ/(1−σ) as γyH converges to zero. Therefore, provided σ > δH , there is an





















Figure 2: Monetary policies for which c̄L(γA)/c̄L(γ I) = 1
that both types of consumers are better off at steady states. Moreover, for σ > δH the ratio
c̄oH(γ
A)/c̄oH(γ
I) is also increasing in γA and c̄oL(γ
A)/c̄oL(γ





Hence, monetary policies with γA = (σ − δH)/δH are optimal in that no other monetary
policy is preferred by both consumer types.
Figure 2 shows the supremum value of γA as a function of (δH/δL,σ) such that welfare
of both consumer types is higher with an active monetary policy for all positive γA smaller
than the supremum of γA.
Welfare during transition
To assess the welfare implications of a change in monetary policy during the transition,
consider an economy that is initially at a monetary steady state with a passive monetary
policy, γyL = γ
y
H = γ
I = 0. At some date t = T , the policy maker unexpectedly implements an
active policy described in the previous section for all t ≥ T , which can be either a transfer
only to H-consumers or an equal transfer to both types of consumers. Equation (5) implies
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that the equilibrium trajectory of the economy along the saddle path, with an initial capital
stock of K̄T = (δHβH(1−σ))1/(1−σ), reads
pt =





σ t−T for t ≥ T +1




1−σ (δHβH(1−σ))1/(1−σ) for t ≥ T +1.





















Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition that L-consumers are better off throughout the










According to L’Hôpital’s rule, there is thus an active monetary policy in the neighborhood
of the passive monetary policy that is always welfare improving provided σ > δH/δL. This
condition does not depend on whether young L-consumers obtain transfers or not.
Consumers born at dates t < T −1 are not affected by the policy change because they do
not live to see the policy change. H-consumers born at date T−1 are also unaffected because
the capital stock and thus the return on capital do not change before date T + 1. However,
L-consumers born at date T−1 are strictly worse off due to the change in monetary policy
because printing money and giving it to H-consumers at date T induces an immediate fall
in the return on holding money. This loss cannot be compensated by monetary transfers.
To see this suppose monetary transfers γoLt to old L-consumers were possible at date T . The









Hence, monetary transfers γoLT > 0 lead to a one-for-one drop in the return on money, leaving
the purchasing power in the hands of old L-consumers at date T , and thus their consumption
coLT−1 = (pT + γ
o
LT )wT , unchanged. Only real transfers, for example a one-off lump sum
transferred from the initial young consumers, can achieve Pareto-improvements.
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Numerical simulation exercises
To better understand the impact of the money printing policy, we perform a series of numeri-
cal simulation exercises using the perfect foresight version of economy in our example. The
parameters are calibrated to match certain characteristics of the US economy. The param-
eter σ is set 1/3 to match the observed long-run capital share of output. We set δH = 0.13
to mirror the fraction of entrepreneurs in the US population. Alternatively, it is possible
for us to exploit the well-known positive sorting between ability and education attainment.
Incidentally, we obtain a very similar calibration of 12.8% if we use the percentage of the
population with masters, doctorates and/or professional degrees.
One ‘generation’ is set to 15 years. We assume that the economy is initially at its steady
state with γyH0 = γ
y
L0 = γ0. The value of γ0 is calibrated to reproduce the US average annual
inflation of 1.9% over the recent 15 year period, ending in 2018. We discipline βH by
the average annualized real interest rate of 1.4% during the same period. For simplicity,
γoH = γ
o
L = 0 for all our exercises. βL is set to ensure βLrt < pt < βHrt for all t so that
the economy stays in monetary equilibrium. L is chosen so that the GDP is one in initial
steady state. It happens that βHr > 1 under our choice of parameters, so that the economy
is dynamically efficient. Table 1 summarizes the baseline calibration.
Parameter Value Remark
σ 1/3 Long-run capital share of output
δH 0.13 The fraction of entrepreneurs in the US (Global Entrepreneur Monitor,
2016), or the fraction of US population holding masters, doctorates,
or professional degrees (Educational Attainment in the United States:
2017, US Census Bureau)
γ0 0.272 US average annual inflation of 1.9% between 2004-2018 based on GDP
deflator (FRED, St Louis Fed)
γ1 0.352 To generate steady state inflation of 2.4% (i.e. 50 basis point higher
than 1.9%) under Policy A
βH 2.454 US average annual real interest rate of 1.4% between 2004-2018 (Trea-
sury inflation indexed long-term average yield. FRED, St Louis Fed)
βL 0.491 βL = βH/5, to ensure βLrt < pt < βHrt
Table 1: Baseline calibration
First we examine the effect of unanticipated expansionary money printing policies. Pol-
icy A is an egalitarian policy such that γyH = γ
y
L for all t. The policy maker increases the
money supply multiplier γ permanently to γ1 from γ0, which results in a 50 basis point in-































Annualized real interest rate, %
Figure 3: Effect of active money printing policy
supply as Policy A in that γyH + γ
y
L = 2γ1. But extra monetary injection is given exclusively
to H consumers. Figure 3 plots the dynamics of key variables under such policies. The
dotted blue lines represents the economy in steady state under the baseline calibration. The
economies under Policies A and B are shown in the solid red line and the dashed orange
line. The figure shows that there exists is a Phillips curve type trade-off between inflation,
1/p−1, and GDP. Note that, unlike the conventional models which requires price frictions
for the Phillips curve, our model generates this relationship through financial frictions with
perfectly flexible prices. The egalitarian Policy A increases the long-run GDP by about
3% while it increases annual inflation by 0.5%. The selective Policy B is able to achieve
about the twice of GDP increments with about a half of inflation rises. The policy effects are
heavily concentrated in the first several periods. The real interest rate is nothing but marginal
product of capital net of depreciation. Even though there is no active loan markets in our
economy due to financial frictions, this captures the (shadow) rate of return on savings.
Next, we consider the effect of one-off expansionary policy. In particular, the policy
maker sets γyH = γ
y




L = γ0 for t > 1, which we
denote Policy A’. In Figure 3, this one-off policy is depicted in violet dotted lines with
square markers. Again, the dynamics of real variables such as GDP and real interest rates
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closely mirror the monetary dynamics summarized in inflation. Notably this one-off money
policy has persistent effects even though capital fully depreciates. This is because money
is injected in constant multiples of wages and they are the function of capital formed in the
previous period.
An alternative monetary policy strategy is to target some rate of inflation and to control
the nominal interest rate as a policy instrument. In this strategy, the quantity of money or its
expansion path is unimportant, both as a target and as an instrument. In economies plagued
with financial frictions, money plays an explicit role above and beyond controlling interest
rates. While monetary policy can achieve its inflation target, it can do more. For any inflation
rate, monetary policy can further manipulate consumption plans, and thus output and even
welfare, by varying the quantities of money that different types of consumers obtain over
their lifetime in a way as described in the analysis above. To illustrate this, we also compare
a constant money printing policy vis-à-vis two inflation targeting policies. In the inflation










for t ≥ 1 (7)
where 1/p∗ is the target inflation rate. This is a generalization of the inflation targeting feed-
back rule commonly used in the central banking literature. The typical inflation targeting
rule requires the central bank to relax (tighten) the economy when the inflation is below
(above) the target, which translates into φ < 0. This is our Inflation Targeting 1. However,
one can argue that the conventional inflation targeting rule, in fact, requires φ > 0. The logic
is that the traditional inflation targeting rules are implemented by setting the higher (lower)
nominal interest rates when the economy is above (below) the target. Since the real interest
rate is predetermined in our model, the policy maker can increase the (shadow) nominal
interest rate by causing inflation, through the Fisher equation. Under this reasoning, the
coefficient φ must be positive because inflation and money growth are positively related.
Hence we also examine the model economy under φ > 0. This is Inflation Targeting 2. As
before, the economy is at the initial steady state inflation of 1.9% implied by γ0. And the
policy maker wishes to maneuver the economy to a new inflation target of 2.4%. This means
γi = γ1 for Equation (7). We set φ = −2 for Inflation Targeting 1 and φ = 2 for Inflation
Targeting 2. This is broadly within the range of the Taylor rule policy coefficient on inflation
(Carlstrom and Jacobson, 2015).
Figure 4 illustrates the dynamics of economy under these alternative policy rules in
comparison with the constant money printing rule (Policy A as in Figure 3). Unlike the
conventional wisdom, both types of inflation targeting rules do not perform well in our
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Figure 4: Constant money growth policy vs. inflation targeting
inflation target. A smaller (absolute) value of φ does reduce the policy induced oscillation
but does not remove it completely. On the other hand, the rule 2 helps smooth the transition
dynamics. But this comes at the expense of much slower adjustments in the real economy.
The inflation targeting has further complications in our economy. As discussed earlier, there
can be many different real outcomes for each ‘inflation targeting’. For instance, given the





sense, it appears that constant money growth policy analogous to the Friedman rule is much
more straightforward and thus favored in this setting.
Discussion
A brief, concluding discussion of the similarities with and differences to Martin and Ventura
(2012) is due. First, new money injections to young consumers Nyit in our model correspond
to new bubbles in Martin and Ventura (2012) while the aggregate money stock Mt+1 matches
their total size of bubbles. Following the long tradition in economics since Samuelson, we
thus treat money as bubble and exploit the mechanism in Martin and Ventura (2012) by
which new bubbles first available to young consumers can be expansionary in the presence
of financial frictions. There are, however, three key differences. First, unlike in Martin and
Ventura (2012), our money is a non-random policy tool. Thus, in principle, new money in-
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jection can be either positive (transfer) or negative (tax). This cannot be the case in financial
bubbles where consumers have only limited liabilities. Second, consumer preferences in our
example are rather extreme, just like in Martin and Ventura (2012). Theorem 2 has shown
that active monetary policies are expansionary under more general preferences, but such
extreme preferences penalize us most when it comes to the welfare evaluation of monetary
policies. Finally, in Martin and Ventura (2012) it is the stochastic nature of the bubble which
drives investment and business cycles, whereas we have provided simple examples in which
deterministic monetary policy rules can generate such cycles in perfect foresight equilibria.
6 Final remarks
Money matters in economies where efficient allocation of savings across investment oppor-
tunities is prevented by frictions in credit markets. The presence of money in itself does not
help mitigate the effects of frictions. However, we have shown that simple monetary poli-
cies in form of printing money and distributing it appropriately do help. Monetary policies
in form of money taxes and money transfers can eliminate the effects of frictions, but these
policies are institutionally much more demanding.
We have demonstrated that different real outcomes can be obtained under the same in-
flation target. Indeed the real effect of printing money depends on how it is distributed.
Therefore the discussion of inflation targeting versus monetary targeting needs to be quali-
fied: central bankers need to go beyond solely monitoring inflation.
We have considered a rather rudimentary asset market with two assets, namely invest-
ment in capital production and money. An additional financial asset would be needed to
study quantitative easing, an unconventional policy recently adopted by some central banks
consisting of exchanging money for financial assets. A natural candidate would be private
credit, but the introduction of private credit would demand easing the frictions in the credit
markets so part of investments could be used as collateral for loans.
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